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1 Introduction and Executive Summary
In the last few decades there has been little convergence of GDP per capita levels in Latin
America with those in the United States. This is in sharp contrast with emerging Asia and
emerging Europe, which both have seen rapid convergence (Figure 1.1).
It has often been argued that the lack of convergence of Latin America is the result of
low investment. It is indeed true that, compared with emerging Asia, investment levels in
Latin America have been modest (Figure 1.2). However, Emerging Europe, which has had
much more modest investment levels than Emerging Asia, has also seen rapid convergence
in the past 25 years, casting doubt on the hypothesis that lack of investment really is to
blame. Indeed, Mexico has been growing more slowly than Poland in per capita terms, but
investment levels in Mexico have been higher (Figure 1.3); and Mexico has a much higher
capital-output ratio (Figure 1.4).
This paper argues that lack of convergence of Latin America is the result of low total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, which is associated with less human capital and lower
scores on governance and business climate indicators.1 Low investment in turn is the result
of low TFP growth, which makes high investment less profitable.
We first show that cross-country differences in GDP per capita levels are the result of
differences in human capital and TFP levels, not of differences in the capital-output ratio.
We then show that cross-country differences in GDP growth rates are also the result of
differences in human capital and TFP growth, rather than capital deepening (an increase
in the capital-output ratio).
We next show that cross-country differences of TFP are associated with cross-country
differences in human capital, governance and business climate indicators. Countries with
high human capital, strong governance and favorable business climates have high TFP;
countries with low human capital, weak governance and poor business climates have low
TFP.
If cross-country differences in income are the result of differences in human capital and
TFP, and TFP depends on human capital and institutions, we would expect that cross-
country differences in income levels are the result of differences in institutions and human
capital. We show that this is indeed the case.
We also demonstrate that once levels of human capital and governance are taken into
account, there is strong conditional cross-country convergence. Poor countries with high
levels of human capital, governance or business climate indicators converge rapidly. Poor
countries without those attributes do not.
We use this analysis to explain the difference between strong convergence in Emerging
Europe and lack of convergence in Latin America in the past 25 years.
1Total factor productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used
in production. As such, its level is determined by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilized in
production (Comin (2008)).
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In the mid 1990s, after the fall of communism, incomes in Emerging Europe were lower
than what could be expected given relatively high levels of human capital. As it also adapted
Western European institutions (in the run-up to EU membership), TFP surged, and the
region converged rapidly. In Latin America, income levels in the mid 1990s were not out
of line with institutions and human capital. Moreover, governance indicators subsequently
deteriorated in many countries. These factors help explain why Latin America did not see
strong convergence.
It should be noted that other factors that are often mentioned to explain the disappoint-
ing growth performance of Latin America do not help explain why CESEE grew faster. For
example, the poorer growth performance of Latin America was not due to higher macro-
economic volatility. Latin American countries grew less than countries in CESEE, but
they had also less growth volatility (Figure 1.5). Indeed, with the notable exception of Ar-
gentina, growth volatility among the large Latin American countries was substantially less
than that in CESEE. Commodity prices can also not explain why Latin America grew less.
Most Latin American countries had positive terms of trade changes, while most CESEE
countries had negative changes (Figure 1.6).
We show why faster growing countries have higher investment rates. If the marginal
return on capital is the same across countries, then countries with faster TFP growth must
see see a faster increase in the capital-labor ratio, which necessitates a higher investment
rate. Similarly, countries with population growth will need higher investment rates to
prevent the capital-labor ratio from falling.
Some caveats. The paper does not argue that investment does not matter. Higher
investment would make Latin America richer, although the impact would be modest only.
In addition, to the extent that technological progress is embodied in new capital, TFP
and investment may not be fully independent: higher investment could also boost TFP.
Rather the paper argues that differences in capital deepening do not explain why CESEE
has converged rapidly over the past 25 years, while Latin America has not.
This paper was mostly written before the Covid-19 pandemic hit. It focuses on the
pre-covid years only. At this stage it is too early too tell whether the pandemic will affect
convergence, and whether human capital, governance and the business climate matter for
the rebound from Covid-19. We leave this important topic for future research.
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2 Why are some countries richer than others? And why do some poorer
countries converge with richer countries while others do not?
2.1 Why are some countries richer than others?
Mathematically, countries can have a higher GDP per capita because they have a higher
employment-to-population ratio (L
P
) or because they have higher labor productivity (Y
L
):
Y
P
=
L
P
Y
L
(1)
In practice, cross-country income differences are due to labor productivity but not employment-
to-population ratio (Figure 2.1).
What, then, explains differences in labor productivity? Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale, labor productivity is equal to:
Y
L
= A
(
K
L
)α
(2)
Labor productivity can increase because TFP increases or because the capital-labor ratio
increases.
Note that increases in the capital-labor ratio are not independent of what happens with
TFP. Higher TFP will lead to a higher capital-labor ratio. To see this, suppose a country
starts on point A in Figure 2.2 (borrowed from Hulten and Isaksson (2007)).
• If the capital-labor ratio rises from k∗ to k∗∗, the country will move to point B.
• If TFP rises and the capital-labor ratio remains constant, the country will move to
point C.
However, if TFP rises, it is unlikely that the capital-labor ratio will remain constant. In
point C the capital-output ratio is lower—and the return on capital higher—than in point
A.2 Assuming that the cost of capital remains unchanged, the increase in TFP will induce
an increase in the capital-labor ratio to k∗∗∗. In point D, the capital-output ratio is the
same as in point A.
In other words, the capital-labor ratio is not an exogenous variable, but one that depends
on TFP. We therefore further rewrite equation (2) as:3
Y
L
= A
1
1−α
(
K
Y
) α
1−α
= A
1
1−α
(α
r
) α
1−α
(3)
It follows that countries can be poorer because they have a lower capital-output ratio (and
thus a higher return on capital), or because they have lower TFP.4
2Note that the capital-output ratio in point A is equal to the ratio of the capital-labor and the output-
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2.2 Convergence, TFP and Returns on Capital
How convergence happens, depends on whether income differences are the result of differ-
ences in the capital-output ratio, or differences in TFP:
• If all income differences are the result of differences in the capital-output ratios; and
there are no differences in TFP, we would expect incomes to converge over time.
Capital will flow from rich countries (where the return on capital is low) to poor
countries (where the return on capital is high), and poor countries will grow faster
than rich countries.
• If all income differences are the result of differences in TFP, rather than differences in
the capital-output ratio, we would not necessarily expect convergence. It will depend
on whether TFP converges. If it does, we would see convergence, but if it doesn’t, we
would not.
• If income differences are the result of both differences in TFP and differences in the
capital-output ratio we would expect see conditional convergence. Countries will
convergence to the income level consistent with their TFP level. As an example,
consider again Figure 2.2. Assume that all countries in South America are on the
black line (associated with low TFP), and all advanced countries on the red line
(associated with high TFP). Then over time, and assuming that the return on capital
converges, we would expect all countries in South America to end up on point A and
all advanced countries on point D.5
2.3 Central Theses
This brings us to the central theses of this paper:
• Cross-country differences in income levels are largely the result of differences in TFP
rather than differences in capital-output ratios. Poorer countries tend to have lower
capital-labor ratios but not lower capital-output ratios.
• TFP differences are the result of differences in institutions. Countries with higher
scores on governance indicators or business climate measures tend to have higher
TFP levels.
labor ratio—the slope of the grey line.
3Note that profit maximizing implies that K
Y
=
α
r
.
4Countries can also be poorer because they have a lower lower α (i.e., capital-income share). In practice,
there is no link between GDP per capita and the capital-income share (Figure 2.3), and this link will not
be pursued in this paper.
5Note that the return on capital in point A and D is the same.
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• Human capital matters as well, both directly and indirectly. Higher human capital is
associated with higher GDP per capita levels. This is in part the result of the impact
of human capital on TFP levels.
• There is no unconditional convergence. There is convergence within some regions.
This may occur because institutions and therefore TFP converge, rather than because
capital-output ratios converge.
• Cross-country differences in GDP per capita growth rates are largely the result of
differences in TFP and human capital growth—not the result of differences in capital
deepening.
• CESEE converged with Western Europe because human capital levels in CESEE
were similar to those in Western Europe. Convergence was further helped by an
improvement in institutions in CESEE. Latin America did not converge with the
United States because human capital levels were much lower, institutions in Latin
America did not improve.
• High investment is endogenous. Countries that have higher TFP growth will see a
faster increase in the capital-labor ratios.
2.4 Country Samples
In this paper, we focus on a comparison of countries in South America and Mexico with Cen-
tral, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, emerging East and Southeast Asia, and advanced
countries. We exclude OPEC countries and other major oil exporters, small countries and
city states. We also drop countries for which some of the data used in the paper are not
available. This leaves us with a group of 47 countries (Annex A).
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Part I
Growth Decomposition of Convergence: The Role of
Capital Deepening, TFP and Human Capital
3 A decomposition of differences in GDP levels
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale.
Y = AKα(H L)1−α (4)
where A is TFP, H is human capital, L is employment (in hours) and K is the capital
stock.
3.1 GDP per capita and the capital-labor ratio
Divide both sides of equation (4) by L:
Y
L
= A
(
K
L
)α
(H)1−α (5)
Taking logs:
log(
Y
L
) = α log
(
K
L
)
+ (1− α) log(H) + log(A) (6)
Using log(Y
L
) = log(Y
P
)− log(L
P
), where P is population, we can rewrite this as:
log(
Y
P
) = log(
L
P
) + α log
(
K
L
)
+ log(A) + (1− α) log(H) (7)
Lower GDP per capita than the US can be the result of a lower employment-to-
population ratio, a lower capital-labor ratio, lower TFP and lower human capital.
Figure 3.1 decomposes differences in GDP per capita levels along the lines of equation
(7).6 Poorer countries are poorer both because they have a lower capital-labor ratio, and
because human capital and TFP is lower.
6As α differs accross countries, if we compare country i with the United States we take for α the average
of the capital income share of country i and the capital income share of the United States. See Inklaar
et al. (2019).
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3.2 GDP per capita and the capital-output ratio
However, equation (7) underestimates the contribution of TFP increases to growth. An
increase in the capital-labor ratio may not be an exogenous contributor to growth, but
rather the result of the increase in TFP (Hall and Jones, 1999, Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare, 1997). Suppose, for example, that the level of A rises with no change in the saving
rate. The resulting higher output increases the amount of physical capital (since the premise
of the example is that the saving rate is unchanged).7
We therefore prefer a slightly different decomposition. In line with the decomposition
considered in Hall and Jones (1999), we subtract α log(Y
L
) on both sides of equation (7)
log
(
Y
P
)
− α log
(
Y
L
)
= log
(
L
P
)
+ α log
(
K
Y
)
+ (1− α) log(H) + log(A) (8)
This can be rewritten as
log
(
Y
P
)
− α log
(
Y
P
)
= (1− α) log
(
L
P
)
+ α log
(
K
Y
)
+ (1− α) log(H) + log(A) (9)
It follows that:
log
(
Y
P
)
= log
(
L
P
)
+
α
1− α
log
(
K
Y
)
+
log(A)
1− α
+ log(H) (10)
Figure 3.2 shows the revised decomposition of differentials in GDP per capita levels.
The chart shows that differences between other countries and the US are mainly due to
human capital and TFP. They are not due to a lower capital-output ratio.
This impression is confirmed by Figure 3.3, which shows the contribution of human
capital and TFP (top panel) and capital deepening (bottom panel) to differences in GDP
per capita with the US. These charts show that income differences are due to human capital
and TFP—not capital deepening.
7The example is from page 156 in Romer (2019).
15
16
17
Higher investment and GDP per capital levels
To what extent would higher investment in poorer countries reduce income differences?
From equation (10) we can derive that if the capital-income ratio rises, so will GDP per
capita.
∆ log(
Y
P
) =
(
α
1− α
)
∆ log
(
K
Y
)
(11)
By how much does the steady capital-output ratio increase if investment rises? It is well
known that in the steady state of a Solow-Swan model (when the investment rate i, working
age population growth n, labor labor augmenting technological progress g and depreciation
δ are all constant), the capital-output ratio is equal to
K
Y
=
i
n+ g + d
(12)
Combining both equations we get:
∆ log(
Y
P
) =
(
α
1− α
)
∆ log
(
i
n+ g + d
)
=
(
α
1− α
)
∆ log(i) (13)
since n+ g + δ do not change.
Brazil’s GDP per capita is 26 percent of that of the United States, while its investment
rate is 16 percent of GDP. If its investment rate increased to 21 percent of of GDP, GDP
per capita would rise to 31 percent of the US level.8 In other words, higher investment in
poorer countries would help reduce the gap with rich countries, but the contribution would
be modest.
8Using a capital income share α of 0.45 (the average over the 1995-2017 period).
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4 A Decomposition of GDP and GDP per Capita Growth Rates
We next look at what explains changes in GDP and per capita GDP, TFP growth or capital
deepening?
Disagreements in the growth accounting literature on whether growth differences are
due to differences in "capital deepening" or differences in TFP growth are in large part
semantic, as they use different definitions of capital deepening. Is capital deepening an
increase in the capital stock, an increase in the capital-labor ratio, or an increase in the
capital-output ratio? Different definitions give very different results.
An example. Suppose GDP grows by 4 percent. Employment grows by 2 percent, the
capital stock by 4 percent, and TFP by 1 percent. The labor income share is 50 percent.
• If we look at the growth of GDP, 75 percent is due to factor accumulation and 25
percent due to TFP.9
• If we look at the growth of GDP per worker, 50 percent is due to an increase in the
capital-labor ratio and 50 percent due to TFP.10
• If we look at the growth of GDP per worker, 0 percent is due to an increase in the
capital-output ratio and 100 percent due to TFP.11
In other words, depending on the definition of capital deepening, the same observations can
lead to vastly different conclusions of the role of "capital deepening" versus TFP growth.
If, as we will do in this paper, we define capital deepening as an increase in the capital-
output ratio, and focus on the change in the growth of GDP per worker, most of the
literature finds that convergence is driven by TFP—not capital deepening. For example,
Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) found that the growth in output per worker in the
three economies, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, and Taiwan Province of China, out of the
four East Asian miracles discussed in Young (1995), came mostly from productivity gains
while Young argued that growth in these economies was largely due to factor accumula-
tion. Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) argued that the increases in the capital were not
exogenous but the result of higher level of productivity.
Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2001) found that difference in the total factor productiv-
ity, rather than factor accumulation, accounts for most of the income and growth difference
across countries and national policies are closely associated with growth in the long-run.
9This follows from equation (14).
10This follows from equation (15).
11This follows from equation (16).
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4.1 GDP growth
We start with decomposing changes in GDP growth. Taking logs and differences, we can
write equation (4) as
y = αk + (1− α)l + (1− α)h+ g (14)
where x = ∆ log(x).
Figure 4.1 shows this decomposition for Poland and Mexico. Poland grew faster because
its capital stock grew faster and because of a more rapid increase of TFP. This was partly
offset by lower employment growth.
Figure 4.2 shows a cross-country comparison of the decomposition of average annual
GDP growth between 1995 and 2018 for a large group of countries. Faster growing countries
tend to have both faster TFP growth and faster growth of the capital stock.
In Penn World Tables, the improvement in human capital is derived from a formula
that is based on average years of schooling. If this overstates the improvement in human
capital, it will understate TFP growth. We therefore also show the same charts, but with
the contribution of TFP growth and human capital combined (Figures 4.1A and 4.1B).
4.2 GDP per capita growth and the capital-labor ratio
Next we look at decomposing changes in GDP per capita. Taking differences we can rewrite
equation (7) as:
y − p = l − p+ α(k − l) + (1− α)h+ g (15)
The change in log GDP per capita depends on the change in the employment rate, the
change in the capital labor ratio, the contribution of human capital, and TFP growth.
Figure 4.3 shows the decomposition for Mexico and Poland. It shows that the capital-
labor ratio in Mexico has not grown much, nor has TFP growth.
Figure 4.4 shows a cross-country comparison. Fast growing countries tend to have faster
TFP growth. The role of the capital-labor ratio is less clear-cut. Slow growing countries
tend to have the smallest increase in the capital-labor ratio. However, there is a group of
countries in the middle that had a very sharp increase in the capital-labor ratio.
Figures 4.3A and 4.4A are the same as figures 4.3 and 4.4, but with contribution of
TFP and human capital combined.
4.3 GDP per capita growth and the capital-output ratio
For the reasons discussed before, equation (15) exaggerates the contribution of capital
deepening. Taking differences we can rewrite equation (10) as
y − p = l − p+
(
α
1− α
)
(k − y) + h+
g
1− α
(16)
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Per capita GDP growth can be attributed to four factors: an increase in the employment
to population ratio (l − p), an increase of human capital (h), an increase of TFP (g), and
capital deepening.
Figure 4.5 shows the decomposition for Mexico and Poland. This suggests that almost
all of the growth difference between Poland and Mexico is due to higher TFP growth in
Poland. Figure 4.6 shows the cross-country comparison. The fastest growing countries have
rapid TFP growth; the slowest have low TFP growth.
Figures 4.5A and 4.6A are the same as figures 4.3 and 4.4, but with contribution of
TFP and human capital combined.
Figure 4.7 confirms that that cross country differences in growth are not associated with
differences in capital deepening. They are associated with differences in TFP and human
capital growth.
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5 TFP: the link with Institutions and Human Capital
We next show that cross-country differences of TFP are associated with cross-country dif-
ferences in human capital, governance and business climate indicators. Countries with
high human capital, strong governance and favorable business climates have higher TFP;
countries with low human capital, weak governance and poor business climates lower TFP.
5.1 Institutions and TFP
Research has found that better institutions are associated with higher GDP per capita lev-
els and faster convergence. The explanation may be that better institutions raise incentives
for both factor accumulation and innovation. They also play an important role in fostering
technological change as well as improving the overall allocative efficiency of factors of pro-
duction (Acemoglu et al., 2005, Hall and Jones, 1999, Joilson and Edinaldo, 2012, North,
1990). Tebaldia and Elmslieb (2013) find that institutional arrangements explain much of
the cross-country variations in patent production, a proxy for technological innovation.
Better governance and business climate indicators are associated with higher TFP levels
(Fadiran and Akanbi, 2017, Giang et al., 2018, Kim and Loayza, 2017, Veeramani and
Bishwanath, 2004). Similarly, poor governance is associated with low TFP, as it leads to
increased distortions and resource misallocations (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013).
In an empirical study, Nguyen and Jamarillo (2014), showed that the return to in-
novation at firm level is higher in countries with better institutions (namely rule of law,
regulatory quality and protection of property rights). They find that the difference in the
return to innovation between Latin American countries with better institutions (especially
protection of property right) and Latin American countries with worse institutions is par-
ticularly large.
Indicators of institutional strength show large cross-country differences. According to
the governance indicators compiled by the World Bank, advanced countries tend to have
higher scores on government effectiveness and rule of law than developing and emerging
market countries (Figure 5.1). Figure 5.1 shows the score for the average indicator; figure
5.2 for the various subindicators. Countries with higher governance scores tend to have
higher TFP levels (Figure 5.3).
The global competitiveness indicators produced by the World Economic Forum show
a similar picture (Figure 5.4). Figure 5.5 shows the scores on the subindicators. There
is a strong link between these indicators of institutional strength and TFP levels. Figure
5.6 shows that countries that score better on the competitiveness indicators tend to have
higher TFP.
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5.2 Human Capital and TFP
According to the economic literature, higher human capital is associated with higher income
levels and faster growth. Having more skilled people facilitates a more rapid adoption of new
technologies and production processes.12 It also facilitates the accumulation of knowledge,
either through learning by doing (Romer, 1986, Stokey, 1988, Young, 1991) or through R&D
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman, 1991) or idea gaps (Romer, 1993).
Test scores (human capital output) may matter more than years of schooling (human
capital input). Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) showed that differences in test scores
(such as PISA) have much stronger explanatory power for growth differentials than years
of schooling. Latin American countries score more poorly on test scores for each year of
schooling than the average student in the rest of the world. According to Hanushek and
Woessmann, poor human capital is one of the key reasons why Latin America has done
relatively poorly.
Some authors have argued that institutions are more important than human capital.
For example, Acemoglu et al. (2014) stresses that it is the impact of institutions on long-
run development is robust, whereas the estimates of the effect of human capital are much
reduced when controlling for the effect of institutions.
Two types of human capital indicators are commonly used in the literature:
• One is based on average years of schooling only.13 We will refer to this type of
indicator as human capital input. The left panel of Figure 5.7 provides a cross-country
comparison, based on Penn World Tables 9.1.
• The second focuses on what students have actually learned. We will refer to this
type of indicator as human capital output. A well-known example are the OECD Pisa
Scores. We will use the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, which takes into account
both quantity of education (years of schooling) and quality (harmonized test scores).
The right panel of Figure 5.7 provides a cross-country comparison of this variable.
Countries with higher human capital input tend to have higher human capital output
(Figure 5.8). However, some countries (including China, Japan and Korea) have human
capital output scores well above what could be expected given human capital input, while
some other countries (including in Latin America) have human capital scores well below
what could be expected given human capital input.
Countries with higher human capital levels tend to have higher TFP levels (Figure 5.9).
This link exists whether we use human capital input or human capital output. Interestingly,
the variation in TPF is higher for countries with high human capital than for countries with
low human capital, suggesting that high human capital is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for high TFP.
12This is a central element of both endogenous growth models that stress innovation and ideas (Romer,
1990), and of models of technological diffusion and growth (Nelson and Phelps, 1966).
13The human capital index converts the years of schooling to an index.
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5.3 Human Capital, Institutions and TFP
Human capital and institutions both matter for TFP. Figure 5.10 shows that the only
countries with high TFP are those with both high human capital and strong governance.
Countries with high human capital and weak governance do not have high TFP. Figure 5.11
provides a similar picture for the link between human capital, the World Economic Forum
competitiveness indicators and TFP. Only countries that score high on both indicators have
high TFP.
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Part II
What Explains Convergence?
6 Income Levels, Institutions and Human Capital
If cross-country differences in income are the result of differences in human capital and TFP,
and TFP depends on human capital and institutions, we would expect that cross-country
differences in income levels are the result of differences in institutions and human capital.
We show that this is indeed the case.
6.1 Indicators of Institutional Strength, Competitiveness, Human Capital and GDP per
Capita
There is a strong link between indicators of institutional strength and GDP per capita
levels. Figure 6.1 shows that countries that score better on government effectiveness tend
to be richer. The link with the rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality is
similarly strong (Table 1).
There is a similar association between the World Economic Forum global competitive-
ness indicators and GDP per capita levels. Figure 6.2 shows the link between the overall
indicator and GDP per capita. The link with infrastructure, skills, institutions and inno-
vation capability is also very strong (Table 2).
Indicators of human capital have a strong link with GDP per capita (Figure 6.3). The
link exists whether we use human capital input or human capital output indicators.
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Table 1: Regression of log GDP per Capita on World Bank Governance Indicators
Coefficient t-value R2
Rule of Law 0.60 15.37 0.85
Government Effectiveness 0.69 15.05 0.84
Average 0.71 14.57 0.83
Regulatory Quality 0.69 12.29 0.78
Control of Corruption 0.51 11.37 0.75
Voice and Accountability 0.62 7.78 0.58
Political Stability 0.61 7.54 0.57
Table 2: Regression of log GDP per Capita on Global Competitiveness Indicators and
Subcomponents
Coefficient t-value R2
Overall 0.06 12.58 0.79
Infrastructure 0.05 11.77 0.76
Innovation capability 0.03 11.50 0.75
Institutions 0.05 11.09 0.74
Skills 0.06 10.90 0.73
Health 0.05 7.72 0.58
Businesss dynamism 0.05 7.37 0.56
Product market 0.06 6.91 0.53
Financial system 0.03 6.52 0.50
Labor market 0.05 6.06 0.46
ICT adoption 0.03 5.93 0.45
Macro stability 0.03 4.86 0.35
Market size 0.01 2.05 0.09
44
45
6.2 Disentangling the importance of the various factors
We run regressions to disentangle the role of the various explanatory variables. We regress
log GDP per capita in 2017 on governance, competitiveness, human capital input and human
capital output (Table 3). All variables are highly significant and the relationships are very
strong. In terms of the R2, the strongest is with governance, competitiveness followed by
human capital output and human capital input. With adding government effectiveness and
human capital all variables are still highly significant, and the R2 is very high.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show that human capital is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for high GDP . Rich countries have both high human capital and strong institutions.
Countries with high human capital but weak institutions are relatively poor.
Table 3: Regressions of 2017 GDP per Capita Levels
Log GDP per capita, 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governance 0.705∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.079)
Competitiveness 0.058∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Human capital input 0.914∗∗∗
(0.171)
Human capital output 5.347∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.644) (0.641)
Constant 9.630∗∗∗ 6.009∗∗∗ 7.168∗∗∗ 6.336∗∗∗ 8.435∗∗∗ 5.710∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.328) (0.554) (0.364) (0.413) (0.297)
N 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.832 0.786 0.399 0.717 0.860 0.841
Adjusted R2 0.828 0.781 0.385 0.711 0.853 0.833
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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7 Convergence: The Role of Changes in Fundamentals
If income levels depend on institutions and human capital, then for convergence to occur
either (i) institutions and human capital need to improve or (ii) initial income levels start
below those suggested by "fundamentals"—i.e., institutions and human capital.
We demonstrate that once levels of human capital and governance are taken into ac-
count, there is indeed strong conditional cross-country convergence. Poor countries with
high levels of human capital, governance or business climate indicators converge rapidly.
Poor countries without those attributes do not.
7.1 Conditional convergence with Initial Income Levels and Fundamentals
The discussion so far suggests that GDP growth not only depends on income levels (the
poorer the country, the faster it grows), but also on the strength of institutions and human
capital. We therefore regress the following equation:
log Y 2017i − log Y
1996
i = pi − αY
1996
i + βI
2017
i + γH
2017
i (17)
where Y stands for GDP per capita, I for institutions (governance or competitiveness),
and H for human capital. The results are in Table 4. Column 1 shows the regression of
the change in GDP per capita between 1996 and 2017 on GDP per capita in 1996. The
coefficient is highly significant. Its value is about 0.3, suggesting that 30 percent of initial
income differences disappeared over the 21-year period. Adding the 2017 level of government
effectiveness and human capital significantly raises the fit; it also increases the value of the
convergence coefficient. Our preferred specification is in Column 5. This equation shows
that once human capital output and governance are taken into account, more than half of
the income differentials disappeared during the 1996-2017 period. We also obtain similar
results when running the same regression but but replaced governance with competitiveness
(Column 6);
We can also link convergence to the strength of institutions and human capital in the
starting year :
log Y 2017i − log Y
1996
i = pi − αY
1996
i + βI
1996
i + γH
1996
i (18)
One problem is that the human capital output variable is not available for 1996. We there-
fore use human capital input. The results are in table 5. Governance is highly significant;
human capital input barely.
The regression results in table 4 and 5 confirm our conjecture that both initial income
levels and "fundamentals" matter. Conditional convergence is much stronger than uncon-
ditional convergence.
This finding is in line with the literature that there is little evidence of unconditional
convergence, but there is evidence of conditional convergence. Jones (2016) shows that while
48
incomes of OECD countries tend to converge, incomes of a broader group of economies do
not. Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (1996) argue that countries that share similar sets of
characteristics (such as saving rates, population growth rates and TFP), tend to converge
to the same income level.
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Table 4: Regressions of Change in GDP per capita, 1996-2017
Change in Log GDP per capita, 1996-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log GDP per capita, 1996 −0.274∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗ −0.589∗∗∗ −0.567∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.060) (0.060) (0.050) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)
Governance, 2017 0.338∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.170
(0.060) (0.065) (0.105)
Competitiveness, 2017 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Human capital output, 2017 2.154∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.433) (0.397) (0.443)
Constant 3.127∗∗∗ 5.641∗∗∗ 3.946∗∗∗ 3.512∗∗∗ 5.069∗∗∗ 3.985∗∗∗ 4.838∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.543) (0.403) (0.332) (0.531) (0.338) (0.623)
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.488 0.710 0.638 0.692 0.764 0.751 0.767
Adjusted R2 0.477 0.697 0.620 0.677 0.746 0.733 0.743
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Regressions of Change in GDP per capita, 1996-2017
Change in Log GDP per capita, 1996-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per capita, 1996 −0.274∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.083) (0.077)
Governance, 1996 0.282∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.082)
Human capital input, 1996 0.198∗∗ 0.126∗
(0.074) (0.073)
Constant 3.127∗∗∗ 3.429∗∗∗ 4.857∗∗∗ 4.481∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.375) (0.756) (0.712)
N 45 45 45 45
R2 0.488 0.608 0.562 0.634
Adjusted R2 0.477 0.589 0.541 0.608
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
7.2 Conditional convergence with Initial Income Gap and Change in Fundamentals
We will now show that convergence depends on both initial "income gaps" and the change in
fundamentals. We determine initial income gaps as the residual in the following regression:
log Y 1996i = λ+ θI
1996
i + φH
1996
i (19)
If GDP per capita in 1996 is lower than what would be expected given levels of human
capital and institutions, the residual will be negative, and we would expect subsequent
GDP growth to be relatively rapid. We then use the residual in the following regression:
log Y 2017i − log Y
1996
i − pi − γ gapi + α
(
I2017i − I
1996
i
)
+ β
(
H2017i −H
1996
i
)
(20)
where gap is the income gap, i.e., the residual in equation (19). The results are in Table 6.
Column 1 shows that the initial income gap matters: the coefficient of the residual is
highly significant. Its value is about 0.47, suggesting that about half of the income gap
disappears during the 1996-2017 period.
Our preferred specification is in Column 4. This equation suggests that changes in
government effectiveness and human capital matter as well.
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Overall, these results confirm the view that convergence depends on both initial income
gaps and the change in fundamentals.
Table 6: Regressions of Change in Log GDP per capita, 1996-2017
Change in Log GDP per capita, 1996-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income gap, 1996 −0.492∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.073) (0.096) (0.068)
Change in governance, 1996-2017 0.532∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.080)
Change in human capital input, 1996-2017 0.427∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.135)
Constant 0.493∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.025) (0.081) (0.058)
N 45 45 45 45
R2 0.361 0.666 0.431 0.718
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.650 0.404 0.698
Notes:
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Part III
Why has Latin America not converged like CESEE?
8 Explaining the differences in convergence between Latin America and
CESEE
We previously discussed that for convergence to occur either (i) institutions and human
capital need to improve or (ii) initial income levels start below those suggested by "funda-
mentals"—i.e., institutions and human capital.
In practice, both factors explain why CESEE has converged and Latin America has not:
• CESEE and East and Southeast Asia have seen an improvement in institutions in the
past 25 years, unlike South America and Mexico. Between 1995 an 2017, countries
in CESEE and East and Southeast Asia saw an improvement in government effec-
tiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption (Figure 8.1). By
contrast, many countries in South America and Mexico saw a deterioration in these
indicators. Most countries saw an improvement in human capital. Countries in East
and Southeast Asia saw the strongest improvement, but there were also improvements
in many countries in CESEE and in South America (Figure 8.2).
• Many countries in CESEE had income levels in the mid-1990s that were below what
could expected given their human capital (Figure 8.3). As a result, strong growth
ensued.
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8.1 Why has CESEE converged rapidly?
In the past 25 years there has been rapid convergence of GDP per capita levels in CESEE
with those in Western Europe. In 1989, on the eve of the fall of the Berlin wall, CESEE
countries were still much poorer than Western Europe. Now, some parts of CESEE now
have income levels similar to Spain and Italy. However, not all countries have done equally
well. Ukraine and Moldova are still poorer than they were in 1989.14
Rapid convergence was associated with rapid and deep reforms. In the early 1990s,
there was a debate whether reforms should be gradual. The worry was that more rapid
reforms would be too painful. Rapid reforms were indeed painful—unemployment in early
reformers rose sharply. However, countries that postponed reforms had a much longer and
deeper initial recession, as without a hard budget constraint on firms, it was hard to get
credit growth and inflation under control. Poland reformed early and started growing again
in 1992 (Figure 8.4), after its economy had shrunk by 15 percent; Ukraine reformed later
and partial, and its economy started growing again only in 1999, after GDP had shrunk by
two thirds. Weaker growth in early transition was not compensated by faster growth later.
Convergence was most rapid in the EU New Member States. EU accession was a
powerful catalyst for reforms and upgrading of institutional frameworks. Prospects of EU
membership led to more reforms (Figure 8.5) and higher growth. The result was convergence
of institutional strength among EU members and candidates (Figure 8.6), which contributed
to convergence of income levels (Alcidi et al., 2018, Próchniaka and Witkowski, 2014a). In
the CIS countries, where there were no such prospects, reforms were much slower. In the
Western Balkans, which suffered from a ‘lost decade’ due to the post-Yugoslavian wars,
reforms started later as well (Piotr and Li, 2018).
Rapid growth in EU New Member States was largely driven by TFP, which far exceeded
that in Western Europe (see Figure 4.6). Capital inflows were large in the pre-crisis boom
years (Bakker and Klingen, 2012), but increases of capital-output ratios did not contribute
much to growth in most countries.
High levels of human capital significantly contributed to CESEE convergence. CESEE
countries inherited high levels of human capital when communism collapsed (Zoega and
Phelps, 2019). Indeed, human capital levels in CESEE were not very different from those
in Western Europe, but income levels were much lower (Figure 8.7).15
Improvements in institutional quality also helped. Masuch and Moshammer (2016) show
that institutional quality is an important explanatory variable for cross-country growth dif-
ferentials across the EU and long-term growth in European economies. Political and eco-
nomic integration with the EU with phased policy reforms to modernize institutions and
14In 1989, Poland and Ukraine had similar income levels, now Poland is about 3 times as rich.
15Bobetko and Josip (2017) show a strong positive relationship between the level of human capital (proxied
by some measure of cognitive skills) and economic growth for CESEE. Kutan and Yigit (2009) found that
human capital is the most important domestic source of labor productivity growth and real convergence in
CESEE.
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greater financial integration that further propelled innovation activity and institutional
changes were especially important for convergence of the EU New Member States to the
EU (see Grela et al., 2017, IMF, 2015, Schadler et al., 2006). Good governance, economic
freedom, as well as business regulations facilitating foreign investment and improving avail-
ability of private credit are also important factors for convergence (Dall’Olio Andrea and
Federica, 2014, Próchniaka and Witkowski, 2014b).
58
59
60
8.2 Why has Latin America not converged?
Latin America did not see similar convergence as CESEE because it did not have the large
gap between (high) human capital and (low) GDP per capita that CESEE had, and because
its institutions did not improve.
• In the mid-1990s, Latin American countries started out with GDP per capita levels
that were somewhat above what could be expected given their levels of human capital
(Figure 8.8). This was very different from CESEE, where income levels were well
below what could be expected.
• Latin America also did not have the strong improvement in institutions that CE-
SEE had. Indeed, there was no convergence of institutional strength with advanced
countries (Figure 8.9).
Why did institutions not improve? In the 1980s and early 1990s, many Latin America
countries had embarked structural reform, from economic liberalization to political liberal-
ization. Why did reforms not continue?
The economic literature points to reform fatigue. According to Lora et al. (2004),
pro-market reform in Latin America countries advanced from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s but showed signs of stall afterward.16 They judged that only ten out of twenty Latin
America countries continued to make progress in reform in early 2000s while seven countries
showed no sign of further reform. Lora et al. (2004) argued that the slow-to-no-progress in
reform reflects the reform fatigue. Echoing this, Birdsall et al. (2010) noted that the region
entered into a period reform fatigue in 2000s when policy makers in the region found little
or no ground to push further additional reforms after many countries had been disappointed
by the outcome of the earlier reforms.
Reform fatigue is a result of a mixture of factors. Reviewing the reform experience
in Latin America countries in 1990s and 2000s, Powell (2013) noted that a mixture of
inappropriate reform measures, poor reform sequencing, and the lack of political viability
or institutional capacity linked to incomplete reforms. Incomplete reforms yielded weaker-
than-expected growth and increased vulnerability. The experience led to reform fatigue and
fall in reform activity subsequently.17 Lora et al. (2004) argued that the public’s perception
that reforms led to weaker growth and higher inequality, despite lack of conclusive evidence,
changed the society’s attitudes towards pro-market reform negatively and contributed to
reform fatigue. 18
16The extent of pro-market reform in Latin America countries was measured by a composite index
constructed in Lora and Panizza (2002).
17Birdsall et al. (2010) discussed three widely debated views on why the reform programs in the region
did not yield the expected result and often considered ended badly, which includes 1) the implementation
of the reform was flawed; 2) the reform program was flawed in itself and 3) the reform program did not
include all that was needed.
18For example, they found that the attitude of Latin Americans towards pro-market reforms that started
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in the 90s had become increasingly critical entering 2000s. According to their study, in 1998, more than
50 percent of Latin Americans thought that privatization was beneficial, but this percentage dropped to
25 percent in 2003. At the same time, the percentage of Latin American thought that a market economy
was good for the country dropped from 77 in 1998 to only 18 percent in 2003. Lora and Olivera (2004)
found empirically that the incumbent political party would be more likely to loss vote in the next general
elections if the government pursued aggressive structural reforms.
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9 Is low investment in Latin America endogenous?
As is well known, there is a strong link between investment and growth. Higher growth is
associated with higher investment but could it be the other way around? Blomström et al.
(1996) showed that output growth Granger-causes investment. Similarly, Carroll and Weil
(1994) showed that causality tends to run from output growth to savings, not the other
way around.
Asia has high growth and high investment. Latin America has low growth and low
investment. It is tempting to blame low growth on low investment.
Assume that investment is endogenous. The marginal return on K is the same every-
where.
Then we would expect high investment in countries where A increases rapidly, and low
investment in countries where A increases slowly.
9.1 Why faster TFP and population growth leads to higher investment: Theory
Production follows a Cobb-Douglas production function:19
Y = Kαγ(AL)1−α (21)
where A is labor-augmenting technological progress, which grows at rate g:
∆ logA = g (22)
We assume wages are flexible—labor is fully employed. The labor force is a constant fraction
of the population, which grows at rate n:
∆ logL = n (23)
Taking logs and differences we can write equation (21) as
y = αγk + (1− α)(n+ g) (24)
The capital stock
Firms will expand the capital stock until the marginal product of capital is equal to the
cost of capital (rc) plus depreciation (δ):
max
K
Kαγ(AL)1−α − (rc + δ)K − wL (25)
It follows that
rc + δ = αγ
Y
K
(26)
19This section is based on Bakker (2019).
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Steady state
In the steady state, the capital stock and GDP grow at the same rate, while the investment
rate i and rc are constant. It follows from equation (24) that
y = k =
(
1− α
1− αγ
)
(n+ g) (27)
Investment rate
The growth rate of the capital stock is equal to:
k =
K˙
K
=
i Y − δ K
K
=
i Y
K
− δ (28)
Combining equations (27) and (28) we get:
i =
(
αγ
rc + δ
)((
1− α
1− αγ
)
(n+ g) + δ
)
(29)
The faster n + g, the higher the investment rate. Since we also have y =
(
1−α
1−αγ
)
(n + g),
we can rewrite equation (29) as
i =
(
αγ
rc + δ
)
(y + δ) (30)
The faster GDP growth, the higher the investment rate.
Does higher investment lead to higher GDP growth?
It should be noted that while GDP growth will lead to higher investment rates, the reverse
does not hold true. If countries with low n + g have high investment rates, they will end
up with high capital-output ratios and high capital consumption to GDP ratios (Bakker,
2019). Japan is a good example of this mechanism. Japan has a gross investment rate of 24
percent of GDP, which is very high given that growth has averaged only [0.5] percent since
[2010]. However, capital consumption is 22 percent of GDP, making net investment only 2
percent of GDP, which together with a high capital-output ratio results in low growth.
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10 Conclusion
In the past 25 years there has been little convergence of income levels in Latin America
with those in the United States. This is sharp contrast with East and Southeast Asia, and
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which have seen rapid convergence.
It has often been argued that the lack of convergence of Latin America is the result
of low investment. Investment in Emerging Asia is about [40] percent of GDP, [double]
the [20] percent of GDP in Latin America. However, the rapid convergence of Emerging
Europe, which has had much more modest investment levels, casts doubt on the narrative
that low investment is to blame.
This paper has argued that low investment in Latin America is not the cause but the
result of low growth.
• Growth has been low because TFP growth has been low, held back by relatively weak
governance and business climate indicators, and by lower levels of human capital.
The paper has shown that while unconditional convergence is quite weak, once we
take levels of governance, business climate and human capital into account, conditional
convergence is strong. Poor countries with high levels of human capital, governance or
business climate indicators converge rapidly. Poor countries without those attributes
do not.
• Investment has been low because TFP growth has been low. High investment with low
TFP growth will lead to a sharp increase in the capital-output ratio and an equivalent
drop in the return on capital and net investment (Bakker (2019)).
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A Countries included
In this paper, we compare countries in South America and Mexico with those in Cen-
tral, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, emerging East and Southeast Asia, and advanced
countries. We exclude OPEC countries and other major oil exporters, small countries and
city states. We also drop countries for which some of the data used in the paper are not
available. This leaves us with a group of 47 countries (Table 6).
Table 7: Countries included
Advanced South America and Mexico CESEE East and Southeast Asia
Cyprus Argentina Bulgaria China
Greece Brazil Czechia Indonesia
Austria Chile Estonia Korea
Belgium Colombia Hungary Malaysia
Denmark Mexico Latvia Philippines
France Peru Lithuania Thailand
Germany Uruguay Moldova
Italy Paraguay Poland
Netherlands Romania
Portgual Russia
Spain Serbia
Sweden Slovakia
Switzerland Slovenia
Great Britain Ukraine
United States
Canada
Japan
New Zealand
Australia
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B Data Sources
• Penn World Tables (PWT) - PWT version 9.1 is a database with information on rela-
tive levels of income, output, input and productivity, covering 182 countries between
1950 and 2017.
• The Conference Board Total Economy DatabaseTM , April 2019 release - A compre-
hensive database with annual data covering GDP, population, employment, hours,
labor quality, capital services, labor productivity, and Total Factor Productivity for
123 countries in the world.20
• The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2019 Update - A project reports aggre-
gate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over
the period 1996–2018, for six dimensions of governance. These aggregate indicators
combine the views of a large number of enterprises, citizens and expert survey respon-
dents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on over 30 individual
data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental
organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.
• The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 4.0, Dataset Version 20181013 - The GCI
analyze competitiveness along 12 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic
environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods
market efficiency, labour market efficiency,financial market development, technological
readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation. These are, in turn,
organized into three subindices in line with three main stages of development: basic
requirements, efficiency enhancers, and innovation and sophistication factors. The
three subindices are given different weights in the calculation of the overall index,
depending on each economy’s stage of development, as proxied by its GDP per capita
and share of exports represented by mineral raw materials. The index maps the
competitiveness landscape of 141 economies through 103 indicators organized into 12
themes. Each indicator, using a scale from 0 to 100, shows how close an economy is
to the ideal state or “frontier” of competitiveness.
• World Bank Human Capital Index. The index measures human capital, looking
at both health and education. The Index is grounded on three pillars: Survival
(share of children surviving past the age of 5 in percent); School, which includes
both quantity of education (expected years of schooling by age 18) and quality of
education (harmonized test scores); and health (which includes both adult survival
rates (share of 15-year-olds who survive until age 60 in percent) and healthy growth
among children (stunting rates of children under 5 in percent.)
20Chinese data is presented in two series, ’China (Alternative)’ and ’China (Official)’. The latter is based
on official data, while ’China (Alternative)’ is from Wu (2014), revised and updated in 2018.
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Table 8: Data Sources and Description
Figure Variable Source Code Description
1.1 GDP per capita WEO ppppc Purchasing Power Parity per capita (PPP
dollars, Units)
1.2 Investment to
GDP ratio
WEO nid_gdp Gross capital formation, current prices in
U.S. dollars, percent of GDP in dollars
1.3 Investment to
GDP ratio
WEO nid_gdp Gross capital formation, current prices in
U.S. dollars, percent of GDP in dollars
Real GDP WEO ngdp_r Gross domestic product, constant prices
(National Currency, Billions)
Population WEO lp Population (Persons, Millions)
GDP per capita Staff
Calculations
ngdp_r/lp
1.4 Y PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
K PWT 9.1 rnna Capital Stock at constant 2011 national
prices (in mil. 2011 US$)
Capital-output
ratio
Staff
calculation
K/Y
1.5 Real return on
capital
PWT 9.1 irr Real internal rate of return
PWT 9.1 labsh Share of labor compensation in GDP at
current national prices
Y PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
tfp PWT 9.1 rtfpna TFP at constant national prices (2011 = 1)
K PWT 9.1 rnna Capital stock at constant 2011 nationa
prices (in mil. 2011 US$)
P PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
GDP per capita Staff
Calculation
Y/P
. . . continued
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. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
1.6 GDP PWT 9.1 rgpdna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population WEO lp Population (Persons, Millions)
ToT Haver IFSANN Terms of Trade [GDP Weighted, Rolling]
(2012=100)
2.1 Y PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
P PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
E PWT 9.1 emp Number of persons engaged (in millions)
GDP per
worker
Staff
Calculation
Y/E
GDP per capita Staff
Calculation
Y/P
Employment to
Population
Staff
Calculation
E/P
2.2 K,L,Y Staff
calculations
Output per worker, TFP and
Capital-Deepening
2.3 P PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Y PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
α PWT 9.1 1 - labsh Share of capital compensation in GDP at
current national prices
3.1-3.3 Y PWT 9.1 cgdpo Output-side real GDP at current PPPs (in
mil. 2011US$)
K PWT 9.1 ck Capital services levels at current PPPs
(USA=1)
H PWT 9.1 hc Human capital index
A PWT 9.1 ctfp TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)
. . . continued
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. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
L Staff
calculations
avh*emp
E PWT 9.1 emp Number of persons engaged (in millions)
PWT 9.1 avh Average annual hours worked by persons
engaged (source: The Conference Board)
P PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
PWT 9.1 labsh Share of labour compensation in GDP at
current national prices
α Staff
calculation
1-labsh
Real return on
capital
PWT 9.1 irr Real internal rate of return
4.1-4.6 y PWT 9.1 GDP_g Growth of GDP, change in the natural log
k PWT 9.1 KSERV_g Growth of Total Capital Services, change in
the natural log
l PWT 9.1 Labor_g Growth of Labor Quantity, change in the
natural log (in hours)
h PWT 9.1 LQ_g Growth of Labor Quality, change in the
natural log
g PWT 9.1e TFP_g Growth of Total Factor Productivity
p PWT 9.1 Growth of population, change in the natural
log
PWT 9.1 POP Midyear population (thousands)
PWT 9.1 LSH Share of Total Labor Compensation in GDP
α Staff
calculations
1-LSH
4.7 tfp PWT 9.1 rtfpna TFP at constant national prices (2011 = 1)
K PWT 9.1 rnna Capital Stock at constant 2011 national
prices (in mil. 2011 US$)
. . . continued
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. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Human capital
input
PWT 9.1 hc
5.1-5.2 WBGI average Average of vae, pve, gee, rqe, rle, cce
Voice and
Accountability
WBGI vae Voice and Accountability, Estimate
Political
Stability and
Absence of
Violence /
Terrorism
WBGI pve Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Estimate
Government
Effectiveness
WBGI gee Government Effectiveness, Estimate
Regulatory
Quality
WBGI rqe Regulatory Quality, Estimate
Rule of Law WBGI rle Rule of Law, Estimate
Control of
Corruption
WBGI cce Control of Corruption, Estimate
5.3 WBGI average Average of vae, pve, gee, rqe, rle, cce
Voice and
Accountability
WBGI vae Voice and Accountability, Estimate
Political
Stability and
Absence of
Violence /
Terrorism
WBGI pve Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Estimate
Government
Effectiveness
WBGI gee Government Effectiveness, Estimate
. . . continued
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. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
Regulatory
Quality
WBGI rqe Regulatory Quality, Estimate
Rule of Law WBGI rle Rule of Law, Estimate
Control of
Corruption
WBGI cce Control of Corruption, Estimate
TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)
5.4-5.5 Overall GCI GCI4_SCORE Overall
Institutions GCI GCI4.A.01_SCORE 1: Institutions
Infrastructure GCI GCI4.A.02_SCORE 2: Infrastructure
ICT adoption GCI GCI4.A.03_SCORE 3: ICT adoption
Macro stability GCI GCI4.A.04_SCORE 4. Macro stability
Health GCI GCI4.B.05_SCORE 5: Health
Skills GCI GCI4.B.06_SCORE 6: Skills
Product market GCI GCI4.C.07_SCORE 7: Product market
Labour market GCI GCI4.C.08_SCORE 8: Labour market
Financial
system
GCI GCI4.C.09_SCORE 9: Financial system
Market size GCI GCI4.C.10_SCORE 10: Market size
Business
dynamism
GCI GCI4.D.11_SCORE 11: Business dynamism
Innovation
Capacity
GCI GCI4.D.12_SCORE 12: Innovation
5.6 Overall GCI GCI4_SCORE Overall
Institutions GCI GCI4.A.01_SCORE 1: Institutions
Infrastructure GCI GCI4.A.02_SCORE 2: Infrastructure
ICT adoption GCI GCI4.A.03_SCORE 3: ICT adoption
Macro stability GCI GCI4.A.04_SCORE 4. Macro stability
. . . continued
78
. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
Health GCI GCI4.B.05_SCORE 5: Health
Skills GCI GCI4.B.06_SCORE 6: Skills
Product market GCI GCI4.C.07_SCORE 7: Product market
Labour market GCI GCI4.C.08_SCORE 8: Labour market
Financial
system
GCI GCI4.C.09_SCORE 9: Financial system
Market size GCI GCI4.C.10_SCORE 10: Market size
Business
dynamism
GCI GCI4.D.11_SCORE 11: Business dynamism
Innovation GCI GCI4.D.12_SCORE 12: Innovation
5.7-5.8 Human capital
input
PWT 9.1 hc
Human capital
output
Worldbank
Human Capital
Index
hci
5.9 TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human capital
input
PWT 9.1 hc
5.10 TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)
Human capital Worldbank
Human Capital
Index
Governance WBGI average Average of vae, pve, gee, rqe, rle, cce
5.11 TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1)
. . . continued
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. . . continued
Figure Variable Source Code Description
Human capital Worldbank
Human Capital
Index
Competitiveness
indicator
GCI GCI4_SCORE Overall
6.1 GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna Governance and GDP per Capita, 2017
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Governance
indicators
WBGI all wbgi
6.2 Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human Capital
Input
PWT 9.1 hc
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna
Competitiveness
indicator
GCI GCI4_SCORE
6.3 Human Capital
Input
PWT 9.1 hc Human Capital and GDP per Capita
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human Capital
Index
world Bank hci
6.4 Governance
Indicators
WBGI all wbgi
Human Capital
Input
PWT 9.1 hc Human Capital and GDP per Capita
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna
. . . continued
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Figure Variable Source Code Description
6.5 Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human Capital
Input
PWT 9.1 hc
TFP PWT 9.1 ctfp
GDP PWT 9.1 rgdpna
Competitiveness
indicator
GCI GCI4_SCORE
8.1 Governance WBGI average Average of vae, pve, gee, rqe, rle, cce
8.2 Human capital
input
PWT 9.1 hc Human capital index
8.3 GDP PWT 9.1 rgpdna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human capital PWT 9.1 hc Human capital index
8.4 GDP PWT 9.1 rgpdna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
EBRD EBRD TI EBRD Transition Indicators (Index)
8.5 EBRD EBRD TI EBRD Transition Indicators (Index)
8.6, 8.9 GDP PWT 9.1 rgpdna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
Human capital PWT 9.1 hc Human capital index
Governance WBGI average Average of vae, pve, gee, rqe, rle, cce
8.7-8.8 GDP PWT 9.1 rgpdna Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices
(in mil. 2011US$)
Population PWT 9.1 pop Population (in millions)
. . . continued
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Figure Variable Source Code Description
Human capital PWT 9.1 hc Human capital index
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